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Relative Wages and Exit Behavior 
among Registered Nurses* 
EDWARD J. SCHUMACHER 
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858 
I examine the exit decision of registered nurses using the longitudinal data files gen­
erated by the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1983 through 1994. By 
examining the wages of workers outside of nursing, a measure of the reservation 
wage is constructed and related to the decision to leave nursing, either for an alter­
native job or to exit employment. My results indicate that nurses respond to outside 
wage opportunities. A one standard deviation decrease in the difference between the 
actual and predicted log wage results in an 8 percent increase in the exit of nurses. 
Secretaries, however, are shown to have a much greater sensitivity to outside wages 
due to the lower degree of occupation-specific training required for secretarial jobs. 
A similar increase in the wage gap for secretaries results in an 18 percent increase in 
turnover. RNs employed in hospitals, covered by a union contract, and employed in 
the public sector are relatively attached to the nursing profession. 
I. Introduction 
The labor market for registered nurses has received considerable attention from both 
researchers and health care policy makers. During the 1980s there were frequent 
reports of nursing shortages even though RN wages were rising considerably faster 
than wages economy-wide. Recently, as the growth in health care expenditures has 
slowed, RN's real and relative wages have fallen (Schumacher, forthcoming). As a 
result, entry-level enrollments in nursing schools declined for the 1995-96 academic 
year for the first time in six years, and new RNs are taking longer to find employ­
ment (Brider, 1996b). While the growing trend of moving care out of the hospital 
into more cost-effective settings and other cost containment measures are expected to 
affect the demand for RNs less than for other health care professionals, it is expected 
that the demand for RNs will continue to decline (Brider, 1996a). 
These factors lead to questions concerning the supply response of registered 
nurses to market changes and relative wages. There have been several studies explic­
itly measuring the labor supply schedule among registered nurses (Link, 1992; Link 
and Settle, 198la, 198lb, 1979; Phillips, 1996). I am aware of only one study which 
examines factors influencing the decision of RNs to exit the labor market: Parker and 
Rickman (1995) find that married RNs are more likely to withdraw from the labor 
force than unmarried RNs, while spouses' income is not an important determinant of 
JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH 
Volume XVIII, Number 4 Fa111997 
582 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH 
labor force withdrawal. Parker and Rickman, however, do not consider alternative 
wages, do not analyze the decision to switch into an alternative occupation, and do 
not examine the issue of measurement error in their data. 
My study examines occupational mobility among registered nurses. Using 
quasi-panels constructed from current and retrospective questions included in the 
March Current Population Surveys, I conduct a longitudinal analysis of flows into 
and out of the registered nursing labor market during the 1983 to 1994 period. The 
decision to exit nursing is related to an estimate of the expected wage if employed in 
alternative occupations. Nursing occupations require a high degree of occupation­
specific training and RNs (once trained) are likely to be relatively immobile across 
occupations and not overly sensitive to outside wages. A greater sensitivity to outside 
wages is likely in occupations where less specific training is required. I test this 
hypothesis by comparing RNs to secretaries. The results indicate that nurses are 
somewhat responsive to their relative wage, although secretaries are substantially 
more sensitive to outside wages. The analysis not only informs us about the function­
ing of nursing labor markets, but provides a useful case study of turnover and occu­
pational choices among professionals. 
II. Employment Flows 
The Data. My primary data are from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and the March-June CPS outgoing rotation group files for the years 1983 through 
1994. The CPS is the primary U.S. household survey conducted monthly by the 
Bureau of the Census. The CPS sample design is such that households are included 
in 8 surveys (rotation groups), beginning with 4 consecutive months in, followed by 
8 months out, followed by 4 months in. Outgoing rotation groups (ORGs) 4 and 8 are 
asked earnings supplement questions (weekly earnings, hours, union status, etc.). 
The March surveys include a supplement that provides retrospective information (for 
all rotation groups) on each worker's employment in the year prior to the survey, 
including the number of employers in the previous year and the longest occupation 
and industry from the previous year. The supplements also contain information on 
total earnings (from all jobs) last year, total weeks worked, and usual hours worked 
per week, allowing a measure of hourly earnings in the previous year to be con­
structed. The March surveys contain information on current earnings (on the primary 
job) and employment for a quarter of the sample (the outgoing rotation groups). 
Those who were not outgoing in March are outgoing in either April, May, or June 
and would report their current earnings, hours, and other variables in these months. 
By matching the March surveys with the ORGs for the months of March, April, May, 
and June, a (nearly) full sample of all March rotation groups is attained, containing 
labor market information for both the current and previous years.1 
The March supplements are constructed from a single survey, and miscoding or 
misreporting is relatively unlikely since the data are gathered at one point in time and 
utilize a single Census coder. Alternatively, longitudinal data from matched ORG 
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files tend to overstate occupational change (Polivka and Rothgeb, 1993). As a check 
on transition rates, however, data from the Sample Survey of Registered Nurses 
(SSRN) for 1984, 1988, and 1992 are also utilized. This survey is conducted by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Services, Health 
Resource and Services Administration. The data, obtained from a mail survey of a 
sample of licensed registered nurses, contain roughly 30,000 observations per year, 
yielding large samples of RNs (including those employed in or out of nursing, unem­
ployed, or out of the labor force). The survey asks if the individual was employed in 
nursing the previous year, allowing separate measures of the numbers of joiners and 
leavers. The SSRN, however, does not ask earnings or other employment characteris­
tics from the previous year. 
Employment Flows. Table 1 presents the major employment flows and mean 
characteristics for RN s from the CPS and the SSRN. Of the 11 ,003 individuals 
employed as RNs in year 1 (i.e., the primary job the previous year), 93.0 percent of 
them are also employed in year 2 (in March-June). According to the SSRN data, 95.8 
of the individuals employed as RNs in the first year are also employed as RNs in the 
subsequent year. The difference in these numbers appears almost exclusively in the 
number of those moving to other occupations (switchers). The CPS data report about 
3 percent of those employed in the first year are employed in an alternative occupa­
tion in the second year, while the SSRN suggest that this is the case for only about 
1 percent of the sample. Both data sources yield similar numbers of individuals with­
drawing from employment (quitters). The CPS measure of occupation is self reported 
(individuals describe their job duties, and Census coders place them in one of about 
500 occupational categories), whereas the SSRN is mailed only to licensed RNs. The 
CPS is likely to contain a broader range of individuals whose occupation is classified 
as RN. Thus, if individuals misreport their longest occupation last year, but accurately 
report their current occupation (or vice versa), they are coded as leavers (or joiners). 
Among those reporting their occupation as RN in the second year, about 4.3 
percent join from another occupation and 1.1 percent enter the labor force. The SSRN 
data do not distinguish those entering the labor force from those entering from 
another occupation, but the total percentage of joiners is similar to that from the CPS 
data. The CPS data suggest that the join rate among RNs is about 5.4 percent while 
the exit rate is about 7.0 percent. RN employment increased consistently over the 
period (Schumacher, forthcoming), so the lower join than exit rate is puzzling. The 
low join rate is due to the nature of the March surveys. Individuals report their 
longest occupation held last year. In order to be considered a joiner, RNs are required 
to report an occupation other than registered nursing or not be employed during the 
year. A typical pattern, however, is for new entrants to finish schooling in early sum­
mer and find a job beginning late in the year. When such entrants are interviewed the 
following March, they report their longest occupation last year as RN and are not 
counted as joiners. The SSRN data show a join rate of 6.3 percent and an exit rate of 
4.2 percent.2 The March data on entry, therefore, understate the extent of new 
entrants in the market, and the analysis below is restricted to exit behavior. 
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Table I 
Employment Flows for RNs 
Employed RNs in Year I 
March CPS 
0.930 
38.91 
0.68 
16.29 
10,235 
.033 
37.06 
0.61 
11.69 
360 
0.036 
43.57 
0.76 
408 
Employed RNs in Year 2 
March CPS 
0.946 
38.91 
0.68 
17.66 
10,235 
0.043 
39.13 
0.61 
14.85 
469 
0.011 
36.92 
0.58 
118 
SSRN 
0.958 
40.65 
0.71 
18.01 
73,915 
0.009 
40.33 
0.70 
696 
0.033 
46.94 
0.78 
2,584 
SSRN 
0.937 
40.65 
0.71 
73,915 
Note: Data are from the March CPS supplements for years 1983-1994, and the Sample Survey of Reg­
istered Nurses for 1984, 1988, and 1992. Characteristics in the top panel are for the second year, 
and those in the bottom panel are for the first year. 
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III. The Predicted Wage and the Decision to Exit 
In a careful study of the labor supply response of registered nurses, Link ( 1992) models 
hours worked, controlling for selectivity through the initial estimation of a labor 
force participation probit model for the years 1960, 1970, 1977, 1980, 1984, and 
1988. His results support previous findings that the own-wage elasticity for married 
nurses was quite high in 1960, but after 1960 the elasticity estimates are relatively 
low (the results are highly variable though, from a low of -0.19 in 1970 to a high of 
0.43 in 1984). The own-wage elasticity on hours worked is lower for unmarried than 
for married RNs. 
Link's results suggest that RNs are not highly sensitive to the real wage and that 
wage increases are unlikely to provide a low cost way of attracting greater hours 
from the stock of currently employed RNs. His analysis first considers the nurse's 
decision (once trained) to either participate in the RN market and then, given the 
decision to participate, estimates how sensitive RNs are to their real wage. My analy­
sis asks a different, but related, question. It relates the decision to leave nursing to the 
relative wage of the individual nurse. 
Information from the CPS on alternative occupations is utilized to measure how 
the relative wage influences the exit decision of nurses. First, a predicted wage based 
on a log-wage regression conducted on a control group of workers is constructed. 
This group consists of females with at least two years of college in the following 
broad occupational categories (with health occupations excluded): professional spe­
cialty occupations; technicians and related support; sales, administrative support, and 
clerical; and service occupations (except protective and household services). This 
regression includes years of schooling, potential experience (the minimum of age­
school - 6 and age - 16) and higher order terms to the fourth power, and dummies for 
race (2), Hispanic origin, large metropolitan area, part-time status, union coverage, 
region (8), marital status (2), public employment, and year (II). The coefficients from 
this regression are then used to construct a predicted wage for RNs, providing an 
estimate of what the nurse would earn if she were employed outside of nursing. The 
"External Gap" is defined as the difference between the actual log real wage and the 
predicted log real wage in the analysis below. As an alternative measure, a similar 
regression is run for a registered nurse sample (including an additional dummy vari­
ables for hospital employment and gender). The "Internal Gap" is calculated as the 
actual log real wage minus the RN predicted log real wage and is intended to capture 
within nursing relative wages. The use of both measures allows a test of the sensitiv­
ity of the two wage structures on the exit decision of RNs.3 
Assuming that variables included in the wage regression fully measure human 
capital and other wage determinants, comparing a nurse's actual wage to her pre­
dicted wage potentially provides a measure of whether the nurse is being "under­
paid" or "overpaid." If there are significant unmeasured worker quality measures 
then individuals who are designated as overpaid could be high (unmeasured) quality, 
while those who are designated as underpaid may be low quality workers. My esti-
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mates, therefore, are likely to understate the true responsiveness to outside wages. 
For example, if all RN s are paid exactly their opportunity cost wage, turnover will 
not vary with measured differences in actual and predicted wages. 
An important issue in occupational mobility is the relative ease of skill transfer. 
RN training tends to be quite specific, and the transfer of these skills to other occupa­
tions is difficult. This is supported by the relatively few number of occupational 
switchers found in Table 1. The less transferable a worker's skills the less sensitive 
he or she is to outside opportunities (once the skills have been obtained). I examine 
this directly by comparing the responsiveness of RN s to the wage gap to the respon­
siveness of secretaries - an occupation where training is more easily transferred. 
The Decision to Exit. If nurses are sensitive to relative wages, and the error in the 
predicted wage is a good measure of over- and underpayment, the smaller is the wage 
gap the more likely they will be to exit nursing. If nurses are not concerned with out­
side opportunities or they are not sufficiently mobile to consider these opportunities, 
then the exit decision and the predicted wage should be uncorrelated. Table 2 dis­
plays the mean for both the external and internal wage gap measures by age, for RN 
stayers, switchers, and quitters. The actual wage is higher than the control group pre­
dicted wage for all three groups, but it is larger for RN stayers than both RN switchers 
and quitters. This is most apparent for young RNs. When the RN wage gap is used, 
stayers have a higher residual than switchers, but not quitters. These results suggest 
that the decision to leave nursing is correlated with the relative wage of the worker.4 
To understand more explicitly the exit decision of RNs, a multinomial logit 
model is estimated to determine the major factors influencing a nurse's decision to 
leave the occupation. I model the decision to exit as a function, not only of personal 
characteristics, but also of the estimated relative payoff from leaving nursing. Table 3 
presents the multinomial logit coefficient estimates for changing occupation and 
leaving employment, with staying in nursing being the omitted reference category. 
The first number in each cell is the coefficient estimate, the second number (in paren­
thesis) is the t-statistic for this estimate, and the third number (in brackets) is the 
marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability of leaving for another 
occupation or quitting the labor market (computed at the means of all the other Xs). 
Many of the marginal effects are statistically significant, although most have small 
magnitudes on the probability of a particular employment state. This is due in large 
part to the fact that only a small percentage of the sample leaves. Only 3.3 percent 
switch and 3.7 percent quit, leaving little variation in the data to explain.5 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the model with both measures of the 
wage residual.6 The wage gaps have an insignificant (though negative in magnitude) 
impact on the decision of an RN to leave employment. Both the internal and external 
gap, however, indicate that the decision to leave nursing for another occupation is 
influenced by the alternative wage. Though the magnitude of the impact is small, the 
larger difference between the RNs actual wage and predicted wage, the less likely the 
RN is to leave nursing. A one standard deviation (0.42) increase in the external gap 
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Table 2 
Mean Predicted Wage Residual by Employment Status and Age Group 
ALL Age 20-35 Age 36-50 Age> 50 
Stayers 
External Gap 0.394 0.448 0.360 0.344 
Internal Gap 0.027 0.029 0.020 0.042 
n 10,235 4,329 4,309 1,597 
Switchers 
External Gap 0.271 0.256 0.270 0.318 
Internal Gap -0.057 -0.121 -0.028 -0.037 
n 360 150 157 53 
Quitters 
External Gap 0.338 0.322 0.316 0.369 
Internal Gap O.Q75 0.031 0.075 0.122 
n 408 166 90 152 
Note: Stayers were employed as RNs in consecutive years; switchers left nursing for another occupation; and quitters left 
employment. External Gap is the difference between the actual log wage and the predicted wage based on a regres­
sion of the control group of female workers. Internal Gap is based on a regression of RNs. 
will result in only a 0.55 percent decrease in the probability that a nurse will leave 
for another occupation. Given the switching rate of about 3.3 percent, this implies 
about a 16.7 percent decrease in RNs leaving for other jobs. A similar increase in the 
internal gap also results in a 0.55 percent decrease in the probability of switching 
occupations. The total effect of a one standard deviation increase in the control group 
residual is a 7.9 percent decrease in RN turnover (both leaving and quitting). As dis­
cussed previously, omitted worker-specific measures of skills will cause the coeffi­
cient to be biased toward zero, implying that these are lower-bound estimates of exit 
sensitivity to wages. Given that I am looking at relatively large samples over a long 
time period, it is assumed that these are long-run differences in turnover rates due to 
differences in wage structure and that the observed wage differentials have built up 
over time. If, however, it is assumed that these are short-run effects of a wage 
change, then RNs in the long run may be more sensitive than what is estimated. 
It was hypothesized that RNs should not be overly sensitive to outside wages 
due to the high degree of occupation-specific training required. In occupations with 
less specific training, the wage gap should have a large impact on the decision to exit. 
The last two columns in Table 3 display the results of estimating the model for secre­
taries? The results indicate that secretaries, indeed, are much more sensitive to out­
side wages than are registered nurses. A one standard deviation increase in the wage 
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Table 3 
Multinomial Log it Estimates of the Probability of Staying Employed as an RN, 
Leaving Nursing for Another Occupation, or Quitting the Labor Market 
Registered Nurses Registered Nurses Secretaries 
SWITCHER QUITTER SWITCHER QUITTER SWITCHER QUITTER 
External Gap -0.745 -0.068 -0.730 -0.580 
(-4.603) (0.383) (-11.892) (-9.873) 
[-0.013] [-0.000) [-0.034] [-0.012] 
Internal Gap -0.790 -0.224 
(-4.740) (1.244) 
[-0.014] [-0.000] 
Hospital -2.157 -6.047 -2.284 -6.112 
Employment (-15.832) (-9.826) (-16.784) (-9.694) 
[-0.037] [-0.004] [-0.039] [-0.004] 
Union Coverage -1.255 -12.269 -1.253 -12.256 -0.520 -13.252 
(-2.446) (-0.068) (-2.441) (-0.068) (-2.293) (-0.082) 
[-0.021] [-0.008] [-0.021) [-0.007) [-0.009] [-0.302) 
Public 0.035 -3.459 0.085 -3.453 -0.112 -3.621 
Employment (0.259) (-6.815) (-0.632) (-6.801) (-1.857) (-16.037) 
[0.001] [-0.002] [0.001] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.083] 
Years of School -0.202 -0.037 -0.152 -0.034 0.016 0.025 
(-5.374) (-1.008) (-1.603) (-1.011) (0.946) (1.621) 
[-0.003] [-0.000] [-0.003] [-0.000] [0.001] [0.001) 
Married, -0.326 0.056 -0.327 0.060 -0.070 0.148 
Spouse Present (-1.862) (0.256) (-1.862) (0.276) (-0.994) (2.058) 
[-0.006) [0.000] [-0.006] [0.000] [-0 003] [0.003] 
Separated, 0.050 -0.114 0.064 -0.105 0.274 -0.133 
Divorced (0.247) (-0.458) (0.319) (-0.421) (3.207) (-1.460) 
or Widowed [0.001] [-0.000] [0.001) [-0.000] [0.013) [-0.003] 
Child0-6 -0.302 0.857 -0.303 0.886 0.111 1.039 
(-1.707) (5.294) (-1.713) (5.289) (1.440) (15.709) 
[-0.005) [0.001] [-0.005) [0.0006) [0.004] [0.024) 
Childl-13 -0.252 0.072 -0.250 0.065 -0.054 0.036 
(-1.490) (0.380) (-1.476) (0.341) (-0.674) (0.463) 
[-0.004] [0.000] [-0.004] [0.000] [-0.003] [0.001) 
Child 14-17 -0.102 -0.518 -0.098 -0.521 0.032 0.073 
(-0.584) (-2.498) (-4.528) (-2.507) (0.418) (1.026) 
[-0.002] [-0.000] [-0.002] [-0.000] [0.001] [0.002] 
FeTIUlle -0.568 0.921 -0.550 0.910 -0.234 -0.421 
(-2.734) (2.415) (-2.651) (2.388) (-1.384) (2.685) 
[-0.010] [0.001] [-0.009] [0.001] [-0.011] [-0.009] 
Chi Square 1,811.905 1,812.086 2,950.479 
Note: Data are from the 1983-1994 March supplements to the CPS. The logit coefficient is shown on the first line, 
t-statistics in parentheses. The numbers in brackets are the marginal impacts of a change in the right-hand-side 
variable on the probability of each employment status. External Gap is the difference between the actual log wage 
and the predicted wage based on a regression of the control group of female workers. Internal Gap is based on a 
regression of RNs. Child 0-6 is a dummy variable for the presence of children between the ages of 0 to 6. Child 
7-13 and Child 14-17 are defined sintilarly. The models also contain real family income, dummies for race (2), 
Hispanic origin, 5 year experience groups (5), metropolitan areas with 1983 population greater than 1 million, year 
(11 ), and region (8). 
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gap (0.48) results in a 1.6 percent decrease in the probability that a secretary leaves 
for another occupation and a 0.58 percent decrease in the probability that a secretary 
leaves employment. The total effect of the increase in the wage gap would be to 
reduce turnover (switching and quitting) by 17 percent - more than twice the effect 
a similar increase would have on RNs. These results support my hypothesis that RN 
jobs require a high degree of occupation-specific training and, once attained, RNs are 
substantially less sensitive to outside wages. Alternatively, secretarial jobs require 
much less occupation-specific training and secretaries are more mobile across occu­
pations and, therefore, more sensitive to outside wages. 
My findings are consistent with Link's conclusion that nurses have relatively 
small own-wage elasticities of hours supplied. I find that the relative wage has a 
small impact on the decision to change occupations, and an even smaller (insignifi­
cant) effect on the probability of leaving the labor market. Note that my findings do 
not imply that RNs are not responsive to wage changes by individual hospitals or 
employers. I show that there is a relatively small impact of relative wages on partici­
pation as an RN among all employers. An individual hospital will observe significant 
employment reduction (at least in the long run) if it lowers its wages relative to other 
employers of RNs. 
While the relative wage is a significant determinant of the decision to remain in 
nursing, its omission does not appear to seriously bias other coefficient estimates.8 
Hospital employment has a significantly negative impact on both the probability of 
switching occupations and quitting the labor market. Note that the substantially 
higher wage paid in hospitals is already accounted for in the internal gap measure. 
This implies that hospital RNs are less likely to exit, even after accounting for higher 
hospital wages. A possible explanation for this stronger attachment to the labor mar­
ket is that hospitals hire and retain the most able RNs. If hospital RNs have an unusu­
ally strong comparative advantage in nursing as compared to RNs in non-hospital 
sectors, then hospital RNs are less likely to exit than non-hospital RNs.9 In addition, 
RNs tend to start their careers in hospitals with some later moving to non-hospital 
settings. Since young workers are least likely to leave the labor market, the impact of 
hospital employment in reducing quits is due, in part, to nurses with less actual ex­
perienced (controlling for potential experience) being employed in hospitals. Young 
RNs are also more likely to change occupations, however, and the negative effect of 
hospital employment on the probability of switching suggests that the effects of hos­
pital employment are not purely age effects. 
Even though union membership is estimated to have only a modest impact on 
the wages of RNs (Hirsch and Schumacher, forthcoming; Cain et al., 1981), Table 3 
suggests that those covered by a union contract are significantly less likely to switch 
to alternative occupations, consistent with the presence of worker rents. Unions may 
provide higher non-wage benefits (e.g., pensions) to nurses not accounted for by 
wage data. My findings are consistent with economy-wide evidence that unions 
decrease quit rates, holding constant wages (Freeman, 1980). RNs in public employ­
ment are less likely to quit employment but are not less likely to change occupations 
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than those employed in the private sector. As expected, the more experience or school­
ing an RN attains, the less likely he or she is to leave nursing for another occupation. 
Schooling has little effect on the probability of quitting employment, not surprising 
given the low variance in schooling among RNs. 
Married RNs are less likely to switch occupations, and separated, divorced, or 
widowed RNs are less likely to quit employment. While married secretaries are sig­
nificantly more likely to quit employment, marriage does not affect the probability of 
leaving employment for RNs. RNs with children between the ages of 0 and 6 years 
are more likely to quit employment and are less likely to change occupations than 
those with no children. Although standard errors are large, point estimates suggest 
that children make RNs substantially less mobile while they do not significantly 
affect the probability of switching for secretaries. These results are similar to Link's 
(1992), who finds that, when no children are in the home, the probability of partici­
pating in the labor market is substantially higher than when at least one child under 
age 6 is present. Not surprisingly female RNs are less likely to change occupations 
and more likely to quit employment than are the small number of male RNs. 
IV. Conclusions 
I examine the occupational mobility of registered nurses. Relative earnings play a 
small but significant role in the decision to switch occupations. The relative wage has 
a negative (though insignificant) impact on the probability of leaving employment. 
That the estimated gap between the actual and alternative wage has a relatively small 
impact on the mobility of RNs is not surprising. First, my measure of the alternative 
wage suffers from an omitted ability problem which drives the relationship toward 
zero. Second, even if a more accurate measure of the outside wage were attained, I 
would still expect a relatively small impact of outside wages on the decision to leave 
nursing due to the relative nontransferability of nursing skills. 
As direct evidence on this point I conduct a similar analysis on secretaries, an 
occupation where required training is much less occupation specific. Consistent with 
theory, while RNs are sensitive to outside opportunities, secretarial employees are 
substantially more sensitive to outside wages. These findings have implications for 
other occupations with occupation-specific (nontransferable) skills. As my results 
suggest, the more transferable are skills across occupation the more attention workers 
will give to alternative occupations. 
Hospitals RNs are significantly more attached to the nursing labor market than 
those employed outside the hospital - even after accounting for higher hospital 
wages. Hospitals may attract the most qualified RNs (or those with a strong compar­
ative advantage in nursing); moreover, Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) find that hos­
pital employment is correlated with unmeasured ability. Also, while there is not a 
large union wage differential among RNs, these results suggest that unionized RNs 
are significantly more attached to the labor market, consistent with worker rents. 
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My results are consistent with the long periods of nursing shortages reported in 
the 1980s. As employers bid up wages to attract RNs into the market, the supply was 
very slow to respond since rising relative wages did not attract currently licensed 
RNs into the market. Similarly, the findings have implications for the apparent 
decline in RN demand experienced over the past few years. My results suggest that 
exit rates should not rise dramatically among RNs as relative RN wages decrease. 
NOTES 
*The author appreciates the helpful comments of Barry Hirsch, David Macpherson, and Leola Ross. 
1Since the CPS is household specific, individuals who changed households between March and their cor­
responding outgoing month (April, May, or June), were not able to be matched and are not included in the 
data set. 
2The SSRN asks if you were employed in nursing one year prior to the date of the survey. 
3For the control regressions I use the monthly CPS outgoing rotation group files for the years 1983 
through 1994 . The sample sizes for these regressions were 269,628 for the control group of non-health 
workers, and 34,806 registered nurses. 
4The regression used to calculate the RN predicted wage was estimated using the entire CPS ORG cross­
sectional data set. The mean residual for all groups, therefore, need not equal zero. 
5 The predicted wage is intended to represent the unobserved wage of the nurse if he or she were employed 
elsewhere. This measure of the reservation wage is estimated by using the difference between the actual 
and predicted wage. These values are measured with sampling error and therefore the standard errors asso­
ciated with the logit equation are incorrect and in general are biased toward zero (Murphy and Topel, 
1985). This is because the parameter estimates are obtained using a predicted value for a right-hand-side 
variable, and additional imprecision not accounted for is introduced into the model. 
60ther than the variables included in Table 3, the model includes real family income, dummy variables for 
race (2) Hispanic origin, 5 year experience categories (5), metropolitan areas with 1983 populations 
greater than I million, year (11), and region (8). 
7 Secretaries are defined as the following three Census occupations: secretaries, stenographers, and typists. 
There are 31,418 secretaries in the sample: 5.8 percent switched to another occupation and 7 .0 percent quit 
employment. 
8In results not shown I estimate the model excluding the wage gap measures. The coefficients and 
marginal effects are virtually identical for all the remaining right-hand-side variables. 
9Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) examine the hospital wage differential among RNs and conclude that it is 
in part due to hospitals attracting higher quality RNs and in part due to compensating wage differentials 
for more demanding working conditions. 
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